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There have been as many considerations about the event as practically no one of them looks satisfactory except maybe for a pair of simple statements, instantly having become a common place: that consequences of the terrorist attacks will concern the whole world community in the most immediate way and that a new political epoch has begun.
Those who have read the book «The Number and Culture. The Rational Unconscious in Language, Fiction, Science, Present Politics, Philosophy, History» if only up to the second chapter do not probably need any additional explanations of the events’ sense, and this article is addressed in the first place to those who have not read it yet. Because of it basic thesises should be depicted first.
What rules the modern societies? As is generally known, societies of modern type are distinctive with their mass character and, thereto, are relatively educated. The quality of the mass character («the mass epoch», this is a period when millions and millions of people become the chief maker of history) means that causes of main social and political processes lie in these masses’ conduct and, what is especially important, in their emotions and notions. Broad social movements, at least for the last centuries, are subordinated to ideologies, carrying inside themselves their own justifications and explanations. The feature of being relatively educated is nothing more than a trivial fact of universal compulsory education, even in underdeveloped countries.
What is studied in school before all? — Arithmetic and writing, i.e. sciences which are the very embodiment of the simplest rationality. For the most part, this rationality is of elementary mathematical — if you please, of «archaic-mathematical» type, grasped, for the latest, by the Antiquity: use of conventional signs (e.g. letters for sounds, numbers for quantities, or, as an instance, sign «+» for the certain mental operation), counting, elementary combinations, obedience to strict rules and so forth (for more details, see, please, the section «Instead of Preface, or the New Unconscious» in the said book). The prevalence of mathematics-like disciplines (besides arithmetic, algebra, geometry — physics, chemistry, even the better part of grammar…) is typical for the whole school course to the utmost extent. Learning truths and operations like these continues over the years and at our most tender and receptive age, when our first and most solid conceptions about surrounding world and about ourselves are formed.
Many things studied in school are forgotten later, but our school years would not be lost without a trace, and the very character of the mental operations mentioned, immanent criteria of «correctness and incorrectness» («logicality») would remain impossible to be undone — independently on a country where we live, our nationality, gender, social status, political believes, and confession. We all are identical in this, and none of the ideologies, none of any significant social motivations are able to neglect the simplest rational truths, but, on the contrary, willy-nilly are guided by them, base themselves on them (otherwise, nobody could believe this ideology and follow it in his/her practical activity). On this ground, in the book was formulated a notion of the rational unconscious being collective by its nature, and this notion was proposed for the role of leading regulatory mechanism in present culture, social frame, politics. Systems all members of which are subjected to the power of the simplest logical laws, for their part, could be investigated by means of elementary-mathematical methods: the method of analysis and its subject are identical here.
As one of the displays of the said rational unconscious could serve a form-creative meaning of the quantity of political revolutions («bifurcations») which have been experienced by one or another mass society in its history. The point is that the knowledge about the existence of these revolutions in its own society and, implicitly, about their quantity is a common property for the population of this society, furthermore, commonly shared by this society as well as it has become our second nature our readiness to be subordinated to indispensable consequences of the fact of one or another quantity. How does it affect a society’s character, its, if you please, «semantic colour»? — The whole second chapter («Revolutions, “revolutions”, society») is devoted to this question.
Examples about. Let us start from societies with two revolutions in their history. Great Britain has been under sign of its two revolutions up to now: Great English and Glorious ones. Likewise with the USA — the War for Independence, reputedly having served at the same time as an anti-feudal revolution, and the Civil War, in the framework of which the key questions of the country’s social and political life were decided, such as: territorial integrity, abolition, choice of the industrial or, as an alternative, the agrarian («plantational») way of development. Both of the states are respected for exemplary liberal ones. In Russia, the second in the succession was the February revolution of 1917 (after the Revolution of 1905–07). «Bourgeois-democratic» in the Marxist terminology, it established, no doubt, the liberal principles: collapse of the absolutism, incontestability of private property, civil rights, multi-party system, preparation for calling on the Constituent Assembly which had to work out the first Russian constitution.
In Germany, where the second by its number was the November revolution of 1918 (after the Revolution of 1848), the monarchy was overthrown, the Weimar republic established, and the country was ruled by a multi-party parliament, the rhetoric of all kinds flourished. Was it not a liberalism?
Behind the contemporary Japan’s back there have been two main political bifurcations, too: the revolution of 1867–68 called the Meiji Restoration and so profound social, economic, and political reforms carried out just after World War II (in particular, the Japanese emperor was removed from the real power) that they are equal in their meaning to a revolution, the second revolution. Who can say that Japan nowadays is not a liberal country, though with an oriental colour? To be short, let us limit ourselves to these examples only. And what would happen with social systems after three revolutions?
One of the first examples of systems like this became Russia, in which in 1917 happened the Great October — the third in general reckoning Russian revolution in the mass epoch. It is generally known that it brought a totalitarianism. In 1932–33, in Germany occurred so-called the «National revolution» (#3), that cardinally redrew the internal political map. Hitler’s regime is the next bright specimen of totalitarianism.
The «March to Rome» of 1922 in Italy brought to power Mussolini — similarly, the third political bifurcation in the country’s history (after the revolutions of 1848–49 and 1859–60, «bourgeois-democratic» by their character). Italian fascism is one more variant of the products of three revolutions.
The «People’s revolution» of 1946–49 in China, the result of which was that the state power was won by the Communists, Mao Tse-tung, is the third one again (after the Shih-k’ai revolution of 1911–13 and bourgeois-democratic revolution of 1925, which brought to the rule the Nationalists). I believe , there is no need to prove that the communist regime in China is a totalitarian one.
In France, being the moral leader of the most revolution movements, the third in its national history was the Revolution of 1848 (two first were the Great French one and the Revolution of 1830). Yet in 1849, the reactionary monarchist «Party of Order» won the election to the Legislative Assembly. In May 1850, the all-nation suffrage was abolished. On December 2, 1851, the president Louis Napoleon was proclaimed emperor, Napoleon III. On the background of political regimes arisen after three revolutions in the 20th century, it would be not quite correct to call the regime of the Second Empire a totalitarian one: in the 19th century, there were not «avant-garde» political parties yet, on the base of which a “real” totalitarianism is usually founded. But the fact that the Second Empire became a forerunner of the latter and according to many indications (a mixture of revolutionary character and dictatorship, suppression of political freedom, exclusion of controversies and disagreements) anticipated it, I presume, would not raise any particular objections.
On the said ground and out of some additional reasons, the conclusion was formulated in the book «Numbers and Culture…» that number of revolution plays role of a certain determinator reflecting the most general features of appropriate political regime, its semantic colour. There has probably been enough illustrations for the article, and for more information, please, see the book.
Now we are coming up to the chief topic. Since the end of the 19th — the beginning of the 20th centuries, the quality of mass character has been acquired by the world community as a whole. It has been written a lot about it: development of communications, economic interdependency, intensification of interchange of goods and ideas… In the given case, as the main bifurcations, radically changing global political frame, stand the World Wars. What kind of political regimes would have been created after two of them?
A nuclear and strategic parity was settled between two super-powers, two blocs — the West, the East, — which were partisans of different ideologies. On the pure structure basis, it could be compared with the two-party system in separate states, say, in the USA and Great Britain. The influential UNO was formed, to which resolutions tried to confine themselves all the states, — in some way, the analogy to a «world parliament». Relatively rare violations of international law met active protests, but, in general, it was backed up by the authority and force of great powers and obtained general recognition. One automatically makes a comparison to the liberal ideal of «legal state». One of the key historic slogans of liberalism was the right of nations to self-determination? — After the Second World War we could see a swift, as an avalanche, disintegration of the previous colonial system, the overwhelming majority of recent colonies achieved their sovereignty. Isn’t it hard to avoid the conclusion that during the said decades the world community as a whole was distinctive with predominantly liberal principles? And if, in addition, we pay heed to the fact that, on the background of the strategic parity between capitalist and socialist blocs, an obvious overweight — in the number of state-allies, economic potential, the extent of influence — was nevertheless on the side of the West (the East was just an «opposition»), then the impression about predominantly liberal world climate in that epoch would only be affirmed.
But from the late 1980s in the world community starts the next global transformation, or bifurcation in the current terminology. «The next in turn» means, of course, the third one by its number. Some analysts inclined towards dramatic metaphors call it «World War III». What a political regime has to answer it? — The readers hardly could be confused now: to all evidence, we should expect for a qualitative intensification of certain authoritarian, or totalitarian, elements.
Indeed, instead of two super-powers only one has remained, — cp. to one-party system in separate states. It has become possible not to respect the recently most authoritative UNO, and such a deviant behaviour could be noticed from the side of leading, «enlightened» powers. The centre of taking of the key for the world decisions has visibly been moving to such an internationally not authorized agency as G7 («seven and a half»), plus, certainly, NATO — cp. to the close circle of the «ordinated» of the Soviet Politburo, which did not have a legal state power but the most important decisions were taken exactly inside it, while for the parliament (the Supreme Soviet) it was left nothing more than to put a «stamp» on what had been prescribed before and beyond. The generally recognised international law? — In the context of rapidly changing conditions, its fundamental principles are changing beyond recognition, and it becomes possible, say, a military NATO’s action against sovereign Yugoslavia. Does this all not resemble something very much? A product of the third bifurcation in the world has a clear inclination for a repetition of genetic features of the political regimes coming along with the third revolutions in separate states.
Of no little importance is a following aspect, either. In some countries, the revolutions by corresponding numbers achieved their actual purposes not at once, not by a leap, but coming through clearly expressed stages. The points of relatively sudden changes, the transitions from one stage to another are named «sub-bifurcations». I suppose, it is understandable: in the course, let us assume, of the third bifurcation occur sub-bifurcations #1, #2, and so forth. Thereto, the consistent patterns of sub-bifurcations’ succession unambiguously repeat such of «big bifurcations» (for more details, please, see the book).
Let me illustrate what it is about. In the wake of the third bifurcation — the Great October revolution of 1917 in Russia — a classical totalitarian regime was established not at once. We do not need any inventions for our purpose, let us stick to what practically everybody in the Soviet Union knew. #1 — the period of the «Military Communism», #2 — the NEP («New Economic Policy»), #3 — the «Great Turning-point» of 1928–29. On the shoulders of exactly the third sub-bifurcation in the USSR was founded that what later was called Stalinism. Whereas #2, the NEP, as it is known, was distinctive with a remarkable «liberal» tinge (of course, at the same time the «commanding heights» were reserved by the only party, because the frame bifurcation was actually the third by its number, i.e. a totalitarian one). In the country, though to a limited extent, were restored private property, free enterprise, and the «chief theorist of the Party» N.Bukharin put up a slogan «Enrich yourselves!». In the sphere of culture, private and co-operative publishing houses were opened one after another, issuing a free-choice literature, by far not always the prolet-correct one, in numerous clubs were carried out events indifferent to postulates of the official ideology. Second and third sub-bifurcations are very similar in their semantic character to bifurcations with the same numbers.
We have said nothing about bifurcations with number 1 yet. Referring to the chapter 2 of the book, we would limit ourselves only to few things: first revolutions are always not quite consistent in their results and/or changeable, they look eclectic on the background of later ones, as a mixture of heterogeneous ideological principles. In France, the Great French revolution, broken out in the name of liberation, resulted in the empire. Napoleon’s regime was not equal, of course, to the former feudal regime of Bourbon’s kingdom, but it hardly resembled a right realization of the liberal model yet. In Britain, after the first revolution was established Cromwell’s dictatorship; in Germany, a consequence of the first revolution, though not instantaneous, was the creation of the Wilhelm’s empire, in which, although, certain political rights existed. In Russia, during the revolution of 1905 the «Manifesto» was royally granted, the State Duma founded, activity of political parties and public organisations was permitted, but backbone of the absolutism was not broken, elections were limited (class representation), Duma’s power was restricted, it was very far from a real political freedom yet.
The same goes to the first sub-bifurcations. Indeed, for example in Russia the Bolsheviks pursued the «Military Communism» policy but the Civil War simultaneously raged. What kind of dominating ideology was in the country in which the «Reds» (the Bolsheviks, left socialist-revolutionaries, a part of anarchists) were fighting with the «Whites» (all the spectrum from monarchists to right socialist-revolutionaries), and, in addition, the «Greens»? — The first one, the second, the third at the same time, people of every description. Is it not an eclecticism? When the Civil War was finished at last, almost immediately the NEP was introduced, i.e. quite a new stage began.
If today’s world community experiences the third in its history political bifurcation, does it not go through sub-bifurcations, either, and if so, then through which ones? The question is even more actual because it concerns everybody among us.
As the first step for dismantling of the post-war («Yalta’s») bi-polar world served Gorbachev’s «perestroika», its attendant energetic international initiatives. Two super-powers, the West and the East, as it was revealed, were not bound to be the enemies. The world as a whole is united, and its ideology must be creative and common. A thesis of «common to all mankind thinking» was suggested. The socialism of Soviet type, which was a scarecrow for all the West countries during a half a century, instantly got a «human face», not without attractiveness. A «Gorbi-mania» seized both the USA and Europe. The USSR and the USA embarked on a track of disarmament, trying to discuss if they should direct a part of military spending saved from the armament race for a help to the «third world». A spasmodic easing of war threats was observed, the political and ideological confrontation was reduced to almost invisible minimum.
Enthusiasm, fascination overwhelmed about everyone, what, let me notice, is quite characteristic for the first big bifurcation (cp. to the rejoicing of the Frenchmen on Bastille’s ruins in 1789 or the euphoria of the Russians when the «Manifesto» was granted in 1905). But the USSR, despite its voluntary objective foreign-policy losses, was still thought to be a super-power. What an ideological, political status does meet such a condition of the world community? — To all appearances, an «ill-defined» one. Who were we, people of the earth, falling down to the clean spring of «common to all mankind thinking»’s ideas — liberals, conservatives, communists? — No, we became for a certain time all that together and nothing taken separately because the habitually «human face» of the world democracy accreted with an at once humanized face of the communism to a some strange Janus. «Velvety» and «singing» revolutions occurred in the recent totalitarian holdings in the Eastern Europe, and nobody oppressed them.
As a matter of fact, such an eclecticism (like a muddle-head) is not able to exist for too long. A principally new landmark, in my view, was put with the collapse of the USSR: one of the world political poles suddenly disappeared. Practically on the whole post-Soviet space a protracted economic crisis was broken out, a falling down almost to the African level. A self-condemnation of the aboriginals, inherent in them already from the previous period, reached in essence a hysterical height: «We, Russians, are slaves, tyrants, and murderers, and have been such for centuries. Our cause now is to confess for the next forty years». Thus, from the established in the world division of forces any foundation was pulled out, up to a moral and ideological disavowal of such division even in the past.
The given stage is the second by its number, and since then there was no question what kind of a world ideology must be predominant: of course, the liberal, democratic, because it only had proved its efficiency and viability. The frame bifurcation, to repeat, is #3, so, in the world is left one master alone: the USA (broader: the West). But the sub-bifurcation is still #2, and that is why the ideological climate is liberal for the most part (a taxonomic parallel is the NEP of the 1920s in the USSR).
It is quite obvious, that in the described condition there was too much of inconsistency. The role of the only leading and driving (therefore, authoritative by its kind) force in the world was won by ideologically liberal countries. Along with a flushing of success, they felt, so to say, uneasy to take up on their shoulders a corresponding role of the global policeman, whereas, as the saying goes, if you called oneself a mighty, then do what should be done. It is always uncomfortable to seat between two stools, what, by the way, was sensed clearly by Stalin at his time and he started reducing the NEP and passing on to the «Great Turning-point».
It was noway easy, let us confess, for the Americans, with their liberal consciousness absorbed with the mother’s milk, with their strong isolationist prejudices, to realize the newest world reality and to accept, without any hesitation, some aspects of their new objective function (to bear a rank of the «world gendarme», you must admit, is not pleasant for everybody). That is why, in order to make the world community being able to follow the necessary laws of the rational unconscious (see the inherent peculiarities of all bifurcations #3), it was just obligatory that something very convincing had to happen to America to make it throw away any hesitation and doubt, which have become inappropriate under present conditions. On September 11, it seemed to have happened. Since then, nobody — not only in America, but practically in the whole world — needs any special explanations and justifications why the world order has to move in direction to a police regime. «A moment of the truth» has come, the terror of swarming everywhere secret and evil enemies should be responded with our, progressive measures. It seems to me as very likely a hypothesis that in the world community, having experienced the third bifurcation already for more than a decade, has started the third sub-bifurcation, too. A taxonomic analogy is the USSR after the «Great Turning point».
Please, forgive me for an unintentional irony, it refers, of course, not to the blood of the innocent victims but exclusively to that measured «mechanism» with which the history of modern — educated, mass — societies repeats its obligatory cycles. The mechanism of the rational unconscious snapped into action like clock-work in this case, too. This mechanism is impersonal, beyond all the ethics. In various concrete cases there are different specific motives for transition of social systems from one state to another, but their logic, their rational sense are always the same.
Possibly not devoid of curiosity is a phenomenon of ideological parallelisms in various systems endued with equal quantity of bifurcations. Thus, in Russia just after the Great October revolution (#3) was «once and for all» established the communist regime, which allegedly brought a realization of mankind’s age-old aspirations. A romantic part of revolutionaries announced a coming of the «golden age», the more circumstantial majority preferred to use a Marxist-Hegelian ideologem of the «end of the history» (indeed, if the motive force of the history is a class struggle and if any antagonistic classes have disappeared in the state of workers, then about what history could we say?). In Germany after the «National revolution» of 1932–33 (#3) the thousand-year Third Reich was founded with nothing to be after it, a dream of medieval mystics and sagacitists had been fulfilled. In Mussolini’s Italy the glory of Ancient Rome was revived once and for all. As early as at the dawn of the third world political bifurcation, the article «The End of the History?» by an American scientist F.Fukujama made its appearance, momentary being caught up by the world. Indeed, if the communism has died for ever and ever and there are no enemies of the world liberalism left any more, then the history, moving ahead by means of contradictions, must just stop, and an eternal triumph of liberal principles and ideas would come.
The other day, on the crest of the third world bifurcation, the president Bush pronounced a sacramental phrase: foreign states have two ways only, «whether to be with America, or to be against us», a periphrasis of the biblical «such who is not with us is against us». The heart of a hardened Russian was wrung by it, because that served as one of the most important slogans in the USSR of the 1930s, in the period of heated struggle with hidden saboteurs, conspirators, and enemies.
It is admissible to feel a vexation when we find a typologic similarity between today’s world political stage and Stalinism, but, what is a pity, it is true over every lamentation. Mere rationally, this is an inevitable development’s phase for the most part of social systems. In the book, it was also written about it: the world community as a whole has chosen the way of not «sea» countries (the USA, Great Britain, Netherlands, Japan) but — together with the beginning of the third bifurcation — has come on the way of «continental» countries (France, Russia, Germany, China…) which after the second political bifurcation experience the third one, then the fourth, the fifth… The «totalitarian» phase (#3) in the last class of systems is indispensable.
To repeat, as far as our analysis is exclusively rational, typological, so any moral or ideological criteria are out of place here. As people say in cases like this, the truth does not know neither laughter nor tears, likewise with the truths of the rational unconscious, either. That is why, although every language by means of which we discuss problems of politics is ideologized by tradition and consequently is overflowed with implicit estimations, still, I would ask you for trying to understand everything said above without any «well or bad». In this connection, it is possibly useful to take a look at present condition of the world community. Within it, indeed, apparently predominant in their population are the continental by their type nations and cultures. That liberalizing historic influence of large trade, intense contacts, that has produced a «moderating», «civilizing» effect over sea countries and made them pioneers of modernization, has side-stepped the overwhelming majority of other nations. The world as a whole, there are little doubts about it, is «continental» in the main. Moreover, it as a whole displays a fatal backwardness compared to the advanced frontiers set up by the developed countries (see the unacceptably colossal contrast in the levels of modernization in the world), it is still a far cry from such internal criteria and motives that are used by the narrow stratum of developed countries. 4/5 of the world community are poor. But the main trouble lies even not here but in that the latter in their current condition being just are not able to develop for the blatant deficiency of those sources in their collective consciousness which give dynamism, impart an impulse to progress. That is why the problems in the world have been accumulated incomparably faster than they have been resolved. Under such conditions, to rely upon a self-development of each country (a purely liberal principle) has become short-sighted and simply dangerous.
There are many unsympathetic features in the character of the contemporary globalism, and as its only preference could serve perhaps that an alternative to it has not been proposed yet — realistic, acceptable one even if to the slightest degree. The same Russia in the beginning of the 20th century and especially after World War I and the Civil War objectively required a «big leap», and it was historically impossible to delay anymore (here, I agree with the Soviet social scientists). The model of accelerated, «overtaking modernization» is practically always associated with a political oppression over the population as the requirement for an increased pace of development, for a mobilization of forces exceeds society’s own capacity, its «I want» (the price of development is, in particular, a sacrifice of a plenty of habitual). A «continental» conservatism, if not to say an inertness, in the world community is, as it has been proved with the previous experience, too strong to keep obstinately holding on to the ancient prejudice about «self-development». An attending difficulty is that the majority of population in the developing countries wants to live as before, according to its social traditions, and to consume as in the West. An uncontrolled demographic growth (one more consequence of «half-civilized» status: the medicine could already prevent high mortality, but the mechanisms of birth rate’s regulation have not engaged yet) only redouble the state of affairs, preparing the ground for an impending «global explosion» (it has written enough about it). In situation like this, the task of utmost importance is not to delay, but to forestall, if the world community is not going to tolerate its own self-destruction in the future. The mentioned Stalin in Russia (the third sub-bifurcation in the framework of the third bifurcation) resorted to a full-scale industrialization, modernization. According to Churchill’s words, he «has taken Russia with plough and left with atomic bomb». Objectively, the world community as a whole has come now to a similar stage (again, the third sub-bifurcation within the third bifurcation). Furthermore, the «natural» self-development in Russia, Germany, other states led on the similar stage of modernization to highly unacceptable forms of totalitarianism. Nowadays, much more numerous next echelon is coming to the same phase. And what, should we let it drift and expect until the process of a «free self-development» gives life firstly to Asian Hitlers, Stalins, then African ones? If on the industrialization as the process within the continental cultures lies such a Cain seal and it is impossible anyway to manage without oppression, then, isn’t it more expedient to take preventive measures, and in more acceptable forms than «natural» ones?
As a certain consolation while observing the coming «totalitarianism square» (the third both bifurcation and sub-bifurcation) can serve that this time the role of authoritative leader has been won by a liberal by its nature force, the USA — in contrast to the Communists in the USSR, Nazis in Germany, Fascists in Italy, which fanatically believed in their unrestricted rights to intimidate and to kill. This means and it is obviously difficult to doubt that the USA would historically soon just «get tired» from their mission of being the «world sheriff» and resign their unpleasant duties with a relief. Anyway, if a voluntary resign is delayed for longer than it should be, it would be assisted, say, by growing China, and a divided power will be automatically not authoritative. Besides, the third world bifurcation is not the last one, of course, and further political bifurcations will be more acceptable by their features (about the fourth, fifth, etc. bifurcations and sub-bifurcations see in the book).
My personal concern is not about a world democracy’s final destiny, rather the opposite. It seems to be crucially important that for comparatively short historic term (according to the recent allegations of American leaders, for 10 years, and not longer than for 20 by objective reasons) today’s «policemen» would menage to fulfil their due civilizing mission and that in the developing countries, though under pressure, could arise internal premises for their constructive self-development. Years later, from the height of their new state, the majority of nations would not, of course, say «thanks» to their recent «oppressor», but the most dangerous stage of development (underdevelopment) would have been in the past already.
We have yet much to say about the sense of the events of September 11, about the epoch which has been opened with them. Thus, it looks nearly providential that the challenge to America has been cast namely by Afghanistan (is it really true is only an abstract academic question for that one is guilty in our virtual world who publicly is announced as such).
So, why exactly Afghanistan and why exactly America? — Using the same terminology, these two countries are like two poles between which the lines of the most critical modern collisions are stretched: the North-the South, sea and continental cultures, post-industrial and pre-industrial stages. Situated in the very heart of the largest mainland, Afghanistan is a very personification of continentalism. Practically, there is no serious foreign trade, communications are almost absent. Autarky. The other pole is an epitome of sea type and openness. The first pole is a symbol of underdevelopment, thrown back by its policy to an ugly caricature of medieval norms (at least, the real Middle Ages did not blow up the Buddha’s statues, in addition, with videotape recording). The second pole is a point of avant-garde, a live picture of the future. That is how matters stand in the majority’s mind, therefore, it is tautologically, virtually true.
Both of the poles were proud deservedly with their «impregnability». According to former geopoliticians, Afghanistan is an incarnated heartland, its core, a «natural bastion». The great powers’ experience — Britain’s in the 19th century, the USSR’s in the 20th — allegedly confirmed the said impregnability. On the other side, the USA, separated from the most countries with oceans, being possessed of more than impressive mighty, were thought to be impregnable, too, but it seems to be not the main thing yet. Finally, the last point has been put in the question about globalization: henceforward, everyone is dependent on everyone, there are no exceptions left. Now, it should be beyond any discussion whether the developed countries have «to want or not to want» to «thrust» their values on the developing ones: «not to thrust» has become quite impossible. If by duty of the strongest, most developed, and dynamic nation the USA did not go enough to meet the developing countries, to a quintessence of their blatant problems — the same Afghanistan, then Afghanistan itself went to the USA. It has come the time for a return visit. And, it is worth to be noticed, if the totalitarian countries have never lost game to their internal opponents, then the world community having turned into a totalitarian one would hardly become a «rara avis».
It will pass 20–30 years, and on the Afghanistan’s territory a noise would be made by the trains hustling from India to the post-Soviet Central Asia, threads of oil and gas pipelines would stretch, the horizon would bristle up with a paling of factory chimneys. In the cities, the doors of transnational companies’ branches would sweep open, and the problems of traffic jams and overcrowded international airports would have to be discussed. A part of nomads would be re-qualified into commercial traveller, another part would settle down, for the third, the targeted UNO’s programs for the preservation of traditional cultures would be claimed. The children would start learning in schools, watching TV, playing computer games. Correspondingly, the neighbouring regions, making nervous at present the governments, for example, of India and China, would «quite down». You say, a Utopia? — If so, then the military action which now is being carried out in Afghanistan would go to waste, and the politically authoritative force in the present world community, except bitter violence, would not bring useful fruits, as it should be. It would mean also that the innocent victims of the September 11 have gone in vain…
| Sept. 2001. |
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